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Summary  Social  competition  is  a  fundamental  mechanism  of  evolution  and  plays  a  central
role in  structuring  individual  interactions  and  communities.  Little  is  known  about  the  factors
that affect  individuals’  competitive  success,  particularly  in  humans.  Key  factors  might  include
stress, a  major  evolutionary  pressure  that  can  affect  the  establishment  of  social  hierarchies
in animals,  and  individuals’  trait  anxiety,  which  largely  determines  susceptibility  to  stress
and constitutes  an  important  determinant  of  differences  in  competitive  outcomes.  Using  an
economic-choice  experiment  to  assess  competitive  self-conﬁdence  in  229  human  subjects  we
found that,  whereas  competitive  self-conﬁdence  is  unaffected  by  an  individual’s  anxiety  level
in control  conditions,  exposure  to  the  Trier  social  stress  test  for  groups  drives  the  behavior  of
individuals  apart:  low-anxiety  individuals  become  overconﬁdent,  and  high-anxiety  individuals
become underconﬁdent.  Cortisol  responses  to  stress  were  found  to  relate  to  self-conﬁdence,
with the  direction  of  the  effects  depending  on  trait  anxiety.  Our  ﬁndings  identify  stress  as  a
major regulator  of  individuals’  competitiveness,  affecting  self-conﬁdence  in  opposite  directions
in high  and  low  anxious  individuals.  Therefore,  our  ﬁndings  imply  that  stress  may  provide  a  new
channel for  generating  social  and  economic  inequality  and,  thus,  not  only  be  a  consequence,
but also  a  cause  of  inequality  through  its  impact  on  competitive  self-conﬁdence  and  decision
making in  ﬁnancially-relevant  situations.
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2.2.  Experimental  procedures16  
. Introduction
ocial  competition  is  a  major  driving  force  in  evolution
nd  an  essential  organizing  principle  for  the  interactions
etween  individuals  and  societies.  In  most  social  species,
he  outcome  of  competitive  encounters  with  conspeciﬁcs
etermines  individuals’  social  rank  along  with  access  to
esources,  and  greatly  inﬂuences  physiology  and  health
Sapolsky,  2005).  Despite  the  important  consequences  of
ontest  competition  on  social  organization  and  health,
he  factors  that  affect  individuals’  competitiveness  beyond
hysical  traits  (such  as  size,  age  or  gender)  or  previous
ocial  experience  (e.g.,  winner  and  loser  effects)  are  largely
nknown.
In  humans,  an  important  attribute  that  strongly  affects
ompetitive  decisions  is  the  degree  of  conﬁdence  in  one’s
bilities  (Taylor  and  Brown,  1988).  Biases  in  self-conﬁdence
i.e.  over-  and  underconﬁdence)  can  greatly  affect  individ-
als’  well-being  and  position  in  society  (Taylor  and  Brown,
988)  as  well  as  eventually  impacting  society  at  differ-
nt  levels,  from  ﬁnancial  markets  to  international  politics.
iven  its  pervasiveness  (Bernardo  and  Welch,  2001;  Johnson,
004),  most  studies  have  so  far  focused  on  the  phenomenon
f  overconﬁdence—–the  belief  that  one  is  better  than  others
n  excess  of  what  is  justiﬁed  by  the  data  (Hoffrage,  2004).
lthough  overconﬁdence  can  lead  to  suboptimal  decisions
ith  potential  negative  consequences  in  the  short-run  [e.g.,
osing  contests  (Camerer  and  Lovallo,  1999),  engaging  in
ostly  wars  (Johnson  and  Fowler,  2011),  making  audacious
conomic  decisions  (Barber  and  Odean,  2001;  Malmendier
nd  Tate,  2005,  2008)  or  providing  inaccurate  and  poten-
ially  catastrophic  expert  judgments  (Plous,  1993)],  it  can
lso  bring  important  advantages  to  the  individual  in  the
ong-run.  Overconﬁdence  can  convey  psychological  bene-
ts,  such  as  increasing  task  motivation  and  persistence,
r  increasing  utility  from  having  a  positive  self-image
Bénabou  and  Tirole,  2002;  Köszegi,  2006;  Pajares,  1996) and
elf  esteem  (Alicke,  1985).  Moreover,  at  the  interpersonal
evel,  overconﬁdent  individuals  are  perceived  by  others  as
ore  competent  and  are,  in  turn,  conferred  higher  status
Anderson  et  al.,  2012;  Burks  et  al.,  2013).  Despite  evi-
ence  that  conﬁdence  levels  in  individuals  and  societies  can
ary  under  changing  circumstances  (Moore  and  Cain,  2007),
ittle  is  known  about  the  factors—–both  environmental  and
ndividual—–that  explain  the  variation  in  self-conﬁdence  in
ompetitive  settings.  Evolutionary  models  have  emphasized
 critical  role  for  environmental  constraints,  with  overconﬁ-
ence  prevailing  when  the  ratio  between  the  beneﬁts  from
ontested  resources  and  the  cost  of  competition  is  high  and
nderconﬁdence  prevailing  when  this  ratio  is  low  (Johnson
nd  Fowler,  2011).
Recently,  acute  stress  was  shown  to  facilitate  the
evelopment  of  social  subordination  during  competitive
ncounters  in  animals  (Cordero  and  Sandi,  2007)  and  to
ffect  decision-making  in  both  animals  (Graham  et  al.,  2010;
haﬁei  et  al.,  2012)  and  humans  (Buchanan  and  Preston,
014;  Pabst  et  al.,  2013).  A  role  for  stress  might  be  par-
icularly  relevant  in  humans,  as  social  and  economic  life  is
arked  by  increasing  inequality  and  rising  stress  (Atkinson
nd  Piketty,  2007).  However,  although  a  great  deal  of
esearch  has  identiﬁed  the  negative  impact  of  social  and
conomic  inequality  in  stress  and  health,  and  highlighted
T
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tress  as  mediator  of  a  wide  range  of  health  problems
erived  from  social  inequality  (Wilkinson  and  Pickett,  2006),
here  is  no  information  as  to  whether  stress  may  itself  cause
ystematic  differences  in  social  and  economic  outcomes.
uch  situations  may  arise,  for  example,  if  stress  would
ifferentially  affect  ﬁnancially  relevant  decision-making  in
ifferent  subpopulations.  Attempts  to  ascertain  the  con-
ribution  of  personality  in  individuals’  self-conﬁdence  have
ocumented  a  lack  of  predictive  power  for  some  personality
raits  (e.g.,  openness,  agreeableness  and  conscientiousness;
urks  et  al.,  2013;  Schaefer  et  al.,  2004)  but  suggested  that
rait  anxiety  might  play  a  role  depending  on  the  context
Schaefer  et  al.,  2004).  We  thus  hypothesized  that  acute
tress  exposure  would  impact  competitive  self-conﬁdence
n  humans,  with  the  outcome  depending  on  the  individuals’
rait  anxiety.
We  tested  this  hypothesis  with  an  economic  choice  exper-
ment  that  involves  a  decision  based  on  a  self-conﬁdence
udgment  of  participants  regarding  their  cognitive  abili-
ies.  Participants,  who  had  been  characterized  for  trait
nxiety  and  performance  in  a  timed  cognitive  ability  (CA)
est  one  week  before  the  experimental  session,  were  asked
o  make  economic  decisions  either  under  control  condi-
ions  or  under  acute  stress  elicited  using  the  Trier  Social
tress  Test  for  groups  (TSST-G;  von  Dawans  et  al.,  2011,
012).  Given  that  uncertainty  has  been  postulated  to  be
ssential  for  under-  and  overconﬁdence  biases  (Johnson
nd  Fowler,  2011),  the  experimental  sessions  involved  two
uccessive  choice-experiments,  to  investigate  participants’
erformance  under  high  and  low  levels  of  uncertainty.
. Materials and methods
.1.  Participants
ealthy  male  and  female  participants  were  recruited  at  the
niversity  of  Lausanne  and  Ecole  Polytechnique  Fédérale  de
ausanne  (EPFL).  They  were  screened  for  several  exclusion
riteria,  including  current  medication  usage,  pregnancy,
r  breastfeeding;  experiencing  a  major  life  change  or  an
nusual  amount  of  stress;  smoking  more  than  ﬁve  cigarettes
er  day;  or  having  a  history  of  medical  or  psychiatric
llness,  insomnia,  night  shift  work,  or  a  history  of  drug  or
lcohol  abuse.  Two  separate  experimental  cohorts  were
cheduled  for  data  collection.  Participants  completed  the
essions  in  groups  of  ﬁve  or  six.  The  ﬁnal  sample  size  was
29  participants,  randomly  assigned  to  either  the  stress
n  = 109:  41  females,  68  males)  or  control  (n  =  120:  48
emales,  72  males)  conditions.
Participant  demographics  are  listed  in  Tables  1  and  S1.
n  additional  group  of  55  participants  was  recruited  sep-
rately  to  play  the  role  of  second  movers  in  some  of  the
conomic  games.  The  second  movers,  who  did  not  have  to
ake  any  decisions,  received  a  cash  payment  depending  on
hom  they  were  paired  with  (mean  payment  =  CHF  21.80).
his  study  was  approved  by  the  Hautes  Etudes  Commerciales
HEC)  Ethics  Committee  of  the  University  of  Lausanne.he  procedure  is  outlined  in  Fig.  1A.  One  week  before
he  experimental  session,  participants  completed  an
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Table  1  Participant  demographics  and  baseline  anxiety  and  physiological  measurements.
Control  group
N =  120
Stress  group
N =  109
p-value  (t-test)
Mean  S.D  Mean  S.D.
Gender  (%  males)  60%  62%  .71,  n.s.
Age 19.78  4.35  19.35  6.03  .54,  n.s.
Trait anxiety  (STAI-T)  34.34  10.18  32.44  8.07  .12,  n.s.
CA test  percentile  54.51  29.14  55.62  28.83  .72,  n.s.
Cortisol (1st  measurement)  5.45  3.72  5  4.56  .42,  n.s.
Subjective stress  (1st  measurement)  21.73  18.46  19.9  16.41  .43,  n.s.
Notes: Baseline characteristics of subjects are reported. Participants completed the STAI-T (State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, Trait scale)
and CA (cognitive ability) tests approximately one week before the experiment was carried out. Cortisol (nmol/L) and subjective stress
measurements were acquired shortly after participants arrived in the laboratory (T1, see Fig. 1), before receiving any experimental
manipulation. N.s.: not signiﬁcant.
Figure  1  (A)  The  timeline  of  the  experimental  session.  Lower  pane:  The  impact  of  the  stress  condition  on  psychological  and
physiological responses  expressed  in  (B)  subjective  stress  ratings,  (C)  salivary  cortisol  and  (D)  heart  rate.  T1—T6:  Time  points  at
which physiological  samples  and  subjective  ratings  of  stress  were  collected.  CA,  cognitive  ability  test;  STAI,  State-Trait  Anxiety
Inventory. Red  lines  indicate  stress  condition,  blue  lines  indicate  control  condition.  Dashed  boxes  indicate  the  time  during  which
the TSST-G  stressors  were  administered.  N  =  224—229  (for  ﬁve  individuals,  the  cortisol  data  was  incomplete  and,  therefore,  omitted
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tfrom the  graph;  for  one  participant  there  was  no  heart  rate  data
references to  color  in  this  ﬁgure  legend,  the  reader  is  referred  
online  behavioral  characterization  containing  demographic
questionnaires,  the  State-Trait  Anxiety  Inventory  (STAI;
Spielberger  et  al.,  1983),  as  well  as  a  custom-made  Cognitive
Ability  (CA)  test:  a  10-minute  timed  version  of  the  Bochumer
Matrizen-test  (Hossiep  et  al.,  1999).  As  we  evaluated  the
impact  of  trait  anxiety  (measured  with  the  STAI-T  scale)
on  economic  choices,  for  statistical  purposes,  STAI-T  values
were  normalized  to  the  minimum  value  in  this  test  (i.e.,  20).
Experimental  sessions  were  performed  in  groups  of  ﬁve  or  six
individuals.  Sessions  took  place  daily  either  between  14:00
and  16:00  or  between  16:00  and  18:00.  Each  day  included
S
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l
iilable).  Results  are  the  means  ±  SEM.  (For  interpretation  of  the
e  web  version  of  this  article.)
 stress  and  a  control  session,  with  order  counterbalanced
cross  days  for  each  experimental  condition.
We  followed  the  procedures  outlined  in  von  Dawans  et  al.
2012).  Upon  arrival  to  the  laboratory,  participants  received
eneral  information,  completed  consent  forms,  and  were
tted  a  heart  rate  monitor  (POLAR  CSX800;  Polar  Elec-
ro,  Kempele,  Finland).  Saliva  samples  were  obtained  using
alivette  sampling  devices  (Sarstedt,  Nümbrecht,  Germany),
nd  visual  analog  scales  were  used  to  assess  perceived
evels  of  stress  at  different  times  throughout  the  exper-
mental  session  (see  T1—T6  in  Fig.  1A).  Economic  games
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ere  fully  explained  and  examples  were  completed  by  the
articipants  to  ensure  their  full  understanding  before  the
tress  or  control  manipulation.  Participants  were  then  told
hich  experimental  group  they  were  assigned  to  and  were
iven  10  min  to  prepare  for  the  sessions.  Participants  in  the
tress  group  were  exposed  to  the  TSST-G,  which  involved  the
reparation  and  delivery  of  an  oral  presentation  simulating  a
ob  interview,  as  well  as  performing  a  mental  arithmetic  task
efore  an  unresponsive  jury  and  video  cameras.  Participants
n  the  control  group  were  given  a  text  to  read  simulta-
eously  in  a  low  voice,  followed  by  an  easy  counting  task.
hese  measures  have  been  shown  to  control  for  the  differ-
nt  factors  of  the  TSST  procedure  excluding  the  psychosocial
tress  component  (von  Dawans  et  al.,  2011).  Following  each
f  the  speaking  and  arithmetic  tasks  (and  amid  saliva  and
uestionnaire  sampling),  both  groups  played  a  series  of  eco-
omic  games,  including  the  overconﬁdence  game  explained
elow.  At  the  end  of  the  experimental  session,  all  partic-
pants  completed  an  attention  test  (d2;  Brickenkamp  and
illmer,  1998)  to  check  for  potential  differences  in  partic-
pants’  attention  due  to  cognitive  load.  The  credibility  of
he  experiments  was  veriﬁed  by  asking  participants  at  the
nd  whether  they  doubted  that  they  were  truly  matched
gainst  another  person,  on  a  scale  between  0 (no  doubt  at
ll)  and  100  (highly  doubtful).  A  large  majority  of  the  partic-
pants  had  little  or  no  doubt  (M  =  27.05,  SD  =  33.24).  At  the
nd  of  the  experimental  session,  decisions  were  entered  and
onetary  pay-outs  calculated  based  on  their  CA  scores  and
andom  parameters.  Participants  were  paid  a  lump  sum  of
5  Swiss  Francs  (CHF  45;  CHF  1  =  1.03  USD)  plus  an  addi-
ional  amount  based  on  the  results  of  their  participation  in
 series  of  economic  games,  which  could  vary  between  CHF
 and  CHF  35.
.3.  Cortisol  assessment
ollowing  each  session,  saliva  samples  were  stored  at  −20 ◦C
ntil  processed.  Samples  were  then  centrifuged  at  3000  rpm
or  15  min  at  room  temperature  and  salivary  cortisol  con-
entrations  measured  by  enzyme  immunoassay  (Salimetrics,
uffolk,  United  Kingdom)  according  to  the  manufacturer’s
nstructions.  The  analytical  sensitivity  for  the  cortisol  assay
s  0.007  g/dL  with  standard  curve  ranging  from  0.012  to
.00  g/dL.  Coefﬁcients  of  variation  for  low  and  high  com-
ercial  controls  were  4.75%  for  intra-assay  and  8.2%  for
nter-assay.
.4.  The  competitive  conﬁdence  game
fter  the  experimental  manipulation,  participants  were  told
hat  they  would  be  matched  with  a  randomly  selected  oppo-
ent  also  participating  in  the  study.  They  were  then  given
he  choice  between  playing  a  lottery  game,  in  which  they
ould  win  20  Swiss  Francs  (CHF  1  =  USD  1.03)  with  a  proba-
ility  p,  or  competing  with  their  opponent  on  the  basis  of
heir  respective  CA  scores  such  that  they  would  be  paid  CHF
0  if  their  score  in  the  CA  test  (that  they  had  taken  the
eek  before)  was  higher  than  their  opponent’s  and  CHF  0
f  not.  Therefore,  payoffs  for  winning  (CHF  20)  and  losing
CHF  0)  were  identical  for  both  the  lottery  and  the  com-
etition.  Responses  were  collected  from  participants  using
F
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he  strategy  method:  participants  were  asked  from  which
robability  p  of  winning  the  lottery  they  would  choose  the
ottery  over  the  CA  competition,  but  were  not  informed
f  their  performance  in  the  CA  test.  Therefore,  this  ﬁrst
xperiment  was  performed  under  high  uncertainty.  Rational
ndividuals  should  switch  to  the  lottery  at  the  probabil-
ty  p  that  they  believe  is  the  probability  that  they  have
utperformed  a  randomly  selected  participant  (henceforth
witching  probability).  A  higher  switching  probability  indi-
ates  higher  conﬁdence  in  one’s  skill,  as  the  individual  will
witch  to  the  lottery  only  when  the  probability  of  winning
s  higher.  Rational  individuals  with  common  priors  should
roduce  uniformly-distributed  switching  probabilities  with
 mean  of  50%.
In  the  second  choice  experiment  and  in  order  to  reduce
ncertainty  levels,  participants  were  given  a  signal  of  their
erformance  and  asked  again  to  indicate  the  probability  p
t  which  they  would  favor  the  lottery  over  the  competition.
peciﬁcally,  we  told  participants  whether  their  score  in  the
A  test  was  above  or  below  the  median  score  of  all  partici-
ants  and  asked  them  to  estimate  their  switching  probability
n  the  same  choice  experiment.
.5.  Descriptive  statistics  and  randomization
hecks
able  1  provides  descriptive  statistics  on  participant  demo-
raphics  and  baseline  anxiety  (STAI-T)  and  physiological
easurements  (i.e.,  saliva  cortisol  and  subjective  stress
evels)  before  the  experimental  session  started,  for  the
ontrol  and  stress  groups  separately.  The  groups  did  not  dif-
er  a  priori  in  any  of  the  considered  variables  (all  p  >  .1).
able  S1  shows  correlations  among  demographics  variables.
o  signiﬁcant  correlation  was  found  for  any  of  the  consid-
red  variables  (i.e.,  gender,  age,  trait  anxiety  and  CA  test
ercentile),  except  for  a  trend  towards  a  negative  correla-
ion  between  trait  anxiety  and  the  performance  in  the  CA
est.  Therefore,  these  checks  conﬁrm  that  the  randomiza-
ion  of  subjects  within  the  experimental  groups  worked  with
espect  to  various  important  variables  that  could  be  related
o  subsequent  experimental  measures.
. Results
.1.  Subjective  and  physiological  impact  of  the
tress manipulation
he  stress  group  exhibited  higher  subjective  stress  ratings
Fig.  1B),  as  well  as  higher  cortisol  (Fig.  1C)  and  heart
ate  levels  (Fig.  1D)  than  the  control  group  throughout
he  session.  For  subjective  stress  ratings,  there  was  no
igniﬁcant  difference  between  control  and  stress  groups
t  the  beginning,  [F(1,  226)  =  0.63,  p  =  .43],  nor  at  the
nd  of  the  session  [F(1,  226)  =  1.35,  p  =  .25].  For  subse-
uent  measurements  (time  points  T1—T4  in  Fig.  1A),  there
as  a difference  between  the  two  groups  (respectively
1,226 =  50.5,  55.65,  4.58,  31.21;  p  <  .001,  p  <  .001,  p  =  .033,
 < .001).  Physiological  measures  also  validated  the  stress
anipulation:  whilst  there  was  no  difference  in  salivary  cor-
isol  levels  between  groups  in  the  two  samples  taken  before
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Figure  2  The  impact  of  stress  on  the  relationship  between  anxiety  and  switching  probability  visualized  using  (A)  median  split  and
(B) linear  regressions  including  cognitive  ability.  Red  boxes  and  lines  denote  stress  condition;  blue  boxes  and  lines  denote  control
condition. N  =  229  for  all  analyses.  (A)  All  groups  exhibited  overconﬁdence  (Wilcoxon  signed  rank  test,  p  <  .001  for  both  stress  and
control conditions),  but  stress  differentially  affected  self-conﬁdence  in  low  and  high  anxious  individuals.  Error  bars  indicate  the
standard error  of  the  mean.  (B)  The  linear  regression  accounts  for  both  cognitive  ability  (CA)  and  continuous  trait  anxiety  and  also
shows no  effect  of  anxiety  on  conﬁdence  levels  in  the  control  condition,  but  a  strong  interaction  with  anxiety  in  the  stress  condition.
Shaded regions  indicate  95%  conﬁdence  bands  around  the  respective  values.  (For  interpretation  of  the  references  to  color  in  this
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dﬁgure legend,  the  reader  is  referred  to  the  web  version  of  this  
the  stress  manipulation  (both  F’s  <  0.64,  both  p’s  >  .42),
stress  participants  had  higher  salivary  cortisol  levels  than
control  participants  in  all  measurements  taken  after  the
manipulation  (all  F’s  >  19.75,  all  p’s  <  .001).  The  heart  rate
differed  between  the  control  and  stress  groups  from  the
minute  after  the  start  of  the  measurement  [F(1,  221)  =  4.07,
p  =  .044],  again  conﬁrming  that  the  TSST-G  procedure  was
effective  in  producing  a  strong  physiological  stress  response.
We  also  performed  a  further  series  of  manipulation
checks  that  allowed  us  to  verify  that  the  stress  manipula-
tion  was  successful  and  the  experiment  was  well-balanced
in  terms  of  allocation  of  individuals  to  different  treatments
(Fig.  1B—D;  Tables  S2  and  S3).  We  also  veriﬁed  that  the
stress  condition  did  not  affect  participants’  attention  lev-
els  as  measured  in  the  d2  attention  test  [Ordinary  Least
Squares  (OLS)  regression  estimate  on  experimental  condi-
tion  =  −0.095,  SD  =  10.782,  R2 <  .001].
3.2.  Main  results
We  then  examined  the  results  from  the  ﬁrst  choice  exper-
iment,  in  which  participants  indicated  at  what  probability
they  would  switch  to  the  lottery  from  the  CA  contest  with-
out  having  received  information  regarding  theirs  or  their
opponent’s  CA  score  (i.e.,  under  high  uncertainty).  On  a  ﬁrst
assessment,  we  observed  that  the  distribution  of  switching
probabilities  has  a  mean  of  58  and  is  clearly  skewed  toward
overconﬁdence  (see  SI  Figure  S1).  A  Wilcoxon  signed  rank
test  rejected  that  the  mean  is  equal  to  50  (its  theoretical
expectation  in  the  rational  benchmark)  for  both  the  stress
and  control  groups  separately  (control:  M  =  57.5,  SD  =  20.2,
m
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 <  .001;  stress:  M  =  59.2,  SD  =  21.2,  p  <  .001).  Thus,  on  aver-
ge,  behavior  in  our  study  is  overconﬁdent.
Importantly,  we  found  strong  support  for  our  hypothe-
is  that  the  response  to  stress  depends  on  trait  anxiety.
e  demonstrate  this  in  two  steps.  In  a  ﬁrst  step,  we  used
 median  split  of  the  trait  anxiety  score,  dividing  par-
icipants  into  high-anxiety  (Control,  n  =  60;  Stress,  n  =  55)
nd  low-anxiety  (Control,  n  =  60;  Stress,  n  = 54)  groups  and
ound  differential  effects  of  stress  [Fig.  2A;  (F(3,225)  =  3.06,
 =  .03)].  While  self-conﬁdence  did  not  signiﬁcantly  differ
etween  low-anxiety  and  high-anxiety  individuals  in  the  con-
rol  condition  [t(120)  =  1.43,  p  =  .15],  differences  in  behavior
etween  these  groups  emerged  in  the  stress  condition
t(109)  =  2.52,  p  =  .01].  Speciﬁcally,  low-anxiety  individuals
ecame  more  self-conﬁdent,  but  stress  had  the  opposite
ffect  in  high-anxiety  individuals,  who  became  less  conﬁ-
ent.  In  a  second  step,  we  used  the  full  range  of  variation
n  trait  anxiety  to  test  for  the  hypothesis  that  trait  anxi-
ty  modulates  stress  effects  with  more  precision  in  a  series
f  linear  regressions  (Fig.  2B  and  Table  2; note  that,  as
tated  in  Section  2,  trait  anxiety  was  normalized  to  its
inimum  value  of  20,  such  that  the  main  effect  of  stress
rom  the  regression  analyses  can  be  directly  interpreted  as
he  effect  on  an  individual  with  the  lowest  possible  anx-
ety  score).  These  regressions  allowed  us  to  control  for
ender  and  performance  on  the  CA.  Since  CA  was  held  con-
tant,  any  effect  of  our  experiment  on  performance  can
irectly  be  interpreted  as  an  effect  on  self-conﬁdence.  The
ain  results  are  displayed  in  column  (1)  of  Table  2.  As  can
e  seen,  the  interaction  of  the  stress  manipulation  with
rait  anxiety  has  a  signiﬁcant  and  quantitatively  important
ffect  on  self-conﬁdence  (p  =  .01).  Individuals  scoring  at  the
120  L.  Goette  et  al.
Table  2  Regression  models  of  self-conﬁdence  on  stress,  trait  anxiety  and  covariates.
Estimated  coefﬁcients  Regression  model
(1)  (2)  (3)
Stress  10.47*
(4.553)
7.830
(6.237)
10.36
(7.461)
Trait  anxiety  (STAI-T)  −0.0625
(0.181)
−0.0702
(0.182)
−0.0628
(0.183)
STAI-T  ×  Stress −0.748*
(0.303)
−0.741*
(0.305)
−0.747*
(0.307)
CA  percentile  0.172**
(0.0445)
0.170**
(0.0442)
0.171**
(0.0594)
Gender  6.766*
(2.755)
4.810
(3.940)
6.764*
(2.749)
Gender  ×  Stress  4.154
(5.488)
CA percentile  ×  Stress  0.00170
(0.0896)
Constant 45.03**
(4.994)
46.39**
(5.424)
45.08**
(5.619)
R2 0.144  .147  .144
Notes: The dependent variable for all models is the switching probability p at which the participant prefers the lottery to the contest
based on performance in the cognitive ability (CA) test. Each column represents a different speciﬁcation, with the explanatory variables
listed in that column. Gender: Female = 0, male = 1; Stress = Experimental condition (Control = 0, Stress = 1). Trait anxiety is normalized
such that the coefﬁcient on the stress condition can be directly interpreted as the effect of the stress condition for an individual with
a minimal score of trait anxiety. OLS linear regression estimates with robust standard errors (in parenthesis). * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***
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inimum  of  the  anxiety  scale  are  signiﬁcantly  overconﬁ-
ent,  and  more  so  than  the  sample  average.  Conversely,
ndividuals  with  the  highest  observed  score  of  trait  anxiety,
ut  same  performance  in  the  CA  test,  estimated  their  prob-
bility  of  winning  at  only  32%,  signiﬁcantly  lower  than  the
ational  benchmark  of  50%.  It  is  also  noteworthy  that  our
esults  show  that  males  were  more  conﬁdent  in  assessing
heir  skills.  Importantly,  although  males  were  signiﬁcantly
ore  overconﬁdent  than  females  in  our  sample,  the  inter-
ction  of  stress  with  trait  anxiety  remains  signiﬁcant  when
ales  are  analyzed  separately  [F(3,135)  =  3.81,  p  =  0.01].
In  order  to  assess  the  statistical  robustness  of  this  result
nd  to  rule  out  alternative  interpretations,  we  performed
everal  robustness  checks  on  this  result,  reported  in  regres-
ions  indicated  in  columns  (2)  and  (3)  of  Table  2. We
xamined  whether  other  variables  typically  correlated  with
rait  anxiety,  rather  than  trait  anxiety  itself,  might  drive
his  pattern.  Thus,  we  ﬁrst  focused  on  the  possible  mod-
rating  effects  of  gender.  Previous  studies  have  suggested
he  existence  of  gender  differences  in  response  to  psychoso-
ial  stress  (Kirschbaum  et  al.,  1992),  suggesting  that  women
end  to  be  more  anxious  than  men  (Wittchen  et  al.,  1994;
essler  et  al.,  2005).  Thus,  we  added  an  interaction  of  the
tress  condition  with  gender  to  the  baseline  speciﬁcation
f  column  (1).  The  estimates  of  the  regression  model  in  col-
mn  (2)  show  that  the  modulation  of  the  stress  manipulation
ffect  by  anxiety  is  still  signiﬁcant,  and  its  point  estimates
nd  quantitative  implications  are  virtually  unchanged.  Fur-
hermore,  the  interaction  with  gender  did  not  modulate  the
tress  manipulation  effects  in  our  study,  as  this  effect  was
ot  signiﬁcant;  thus  we  cannot  reject  the  hypothesis  that
w
i
a
Tales  and  female  respond  similarly  to  the  stress  condition.
e  next  investigated  whether  the  CA  score  was  moderating
he  effects  of  stress.  In  column  (3),  we  added  an  interac-
ion  with  the  CA  score  to  the  baseline  regression  model.
ne  may  argue  that  differences  in  ability,  rather  than  dif-
erences  in  anxiety,  modulate  stress  effects.  However,  our
esults  do  not  support  this  interpretation:  trait  anxiety  sig-
iﬁcantly  modulates  stress,  while  the  additional  interaction
ith  the  percentile  of  the  CA  performance  was  not  statisti-
ally  signiﬁcant.
.3.  Cortisol  responses  and  conﬁdence
e  then  evaluated  whether  cortisol  responses  capture  the
reatment  effects.  To  this  end,  we  ﬁrst  calculated  the  area
nder  the  curve  measure  using  the  cortisol  measurements
3—T6  relative  to  the  baseline  measures  T1  and  T2  (see
ig.  1A),  when  both  groups’  levels  do  not  differ  (Fig.  2C).
hen,  we  estimated  a  regression  model  (OLS)  using  these
ortisol  responses  and  an  interaction  with  trait  anxiety
s  our  dependent  variable  while  controlling  for  CA  test
erformance,  trait  anxiety  and  gender.  The  results  are  dis-
layed  in  column  (1;  OLS)  of  Table  3. We  also  estimated
he  same  regression  model,  but  using  the  treatment  group
ssignment  and  its  interaction  with  trait  anxiety  as  instru-
ental  variables  (IV)  for  cortisol  response  and  its  interaction
ith  anxiety.  The  IV-estimate  only  uses  variation  in  cortisol
nduced  by  the  experiment  and  the  interaction  with  trait
nxiety,  to  identify  the  impact  of  cortisol  on  conﬁdence.
he  results  from  this  analysis  are  displayed  in  column  (2;
Anxiety  leads  to  differences  in  competitive  conﬁdence  under  str
Table  3  Regression  models  of  self-conﬁdence  and  its  rela-
tionship to  cortisol  responses.
Estimated  coefﬁcients  Estimation  method
(1)  OLS
estimate
(2)  IV
estimate
Cortisol  response 0.584**
(0.196)
0.865*
(0.362)
Trait  anxiety  (STAI-T) −0.0191
(0.184)
0.189
(0.288)
STAI-T  ×  Cortisol
response
−0.0399*
(0.0162)
−0.0661*
(0.0263)
CA  percentile  0.174**
(0.0454)
0.172**
(0.0449)
Gender  6.527*
(2.868)
6.782*
(2.849)
Constant  43.85**
(4.662)
41.42**
(5.704)
F-test:  interaction  stress
and  trait  anxiety
p  =  .003  p  =  .003
R2 .161  .147
Notes: The dependent variable for all models is the switching
probability p at which the participant prefers the lottery to the
contest based on performance in the cognitive ability (CA) test.
Gender: Female = 0, male = 1; Cortisol response = area under the
curve measure of cortisol response over the entire experimen-
tal session relative to baseline measurements T1 and T2. Trait
anxiety is normalized such that the coefﬁcient on the stress con-
dition can be directly interpreted as the effect of the cortisol
response for an individual with a minimal score of trait anxiety.
The ﬁrst column presents the estimates from the Ordinary Least
Square (OLS) regression, the second column the instrumental
variables (IV) estimates with the stress condition and the stress
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rcondition interacted with trait anxiety as instruments. Robust
standard errors. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. N = 217, as 12
cortisol measurements failed for technical reasons.
IV)  of  Table  3.  Both  sets  of  results  show  the  same  picture.
The  impact  of  the  cortisol  response  on  conﬁdence  strongly
depends  on  trait  anxiety:  for  individuals  scoring  low  on
trait  anxiety,  a  higher  cortisol  response  was  associated  with
higher  conﬁdence,  taking  into  account  their  performance  in
the  CA  test  and  their  gender.  For  individuals  scoring  high  in
trait  anxiety,  the  sign  was  reversed  and  higher  cortisol  was
associated  with  lower  conﬁdence.  This  implies  that,  under
stress,  self-conﬁdence  in  a  very  low  anxious  individual  would
increase  by  11  percentage  points,  while  in  a  high  anxious
individual,  scoring  at  the  90th  percentile  in  the  STAI-T,  it
would  decrease  by  13  percentage  points.  To  put  this  into
perspective,  this  24  percentage  point  difference  amounts
to  almost  four  times  the  gender  effect  on  overconﬁdence.
3.4.  Conﬁdence  assessments  with  a  signal
We  also  analyzed  the  data  from  the  second  choice  experi-
ment  in  which  the  participants  were  given  a  rough  indication
of  how  they  scored  in  the  CA  test  (whether  they  were  above
or  below  the  median)  that  they  had  performed  around  one
week  before  the  experimental  session.  As  we  hypothesized,
in  this  treatment,  we  ﬁnd  no  association  between  the  stress
condition  or  its  interaction  with  anxiety,  or  the  cortisol
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esponse  and  the  behavior  (all  p’s  >  .1,  see  SI  Table  S4).
he  signal  is  the  only  signiﬁcant  predictor  of  participants’
ehavior  in  this  case;  not  even  gender  plays  a  signiﬁcant
ffect.
.  Discussion
e  investigated  the  impact  of  acute  stress  on  self-conﬁdent
ehavior  to  compete  for  a  monetary  reward  and  its  mod-
lation  by  trait  anxiety.  In  the  absence  of  stress,  both
igh-anxiety  and  low-anxiety  individuals  exhibited  overcon-
dent  behavior  to  a  similar  extent.  This  ﬁts  with  numerous
eports  indicating  that  overconﬁdence  is  pervasive  in  our
ocieties,  along  with  recent  evolutionary  models  that  pro-
ose  that  natural  selection  has  favored  the  emergence
f  overconﬁdent  populations  (Johnson  and  Fowler,  2011;
rivers,  2000;  von  Hippel  and  Trivers,  2011).  Strikingly,
owever,  stress  interacted  with  personality  to  inﬂuence  con-
dence,  driving  the  behavior  of  individuals  differing  in  trait
nxiety  in  opposite  directions;  i.e.,  increasing  overconﬁ-
ence  in  participants  with  lower  anxiety,  while  reducing
elf-conﬁdence  in  individuals  with  higher  anxiety.  These
ndings  reveal  that  overconﬁdence  is  not  necessarily  a  ﬁxed
ttribute  of  individuals  but  instead  can  be  shaped  by  the
nteraction  of  personality  and  stress.
This  result  was  not  due  to  the  effect  of  other  variables
orrelated  with  trait  anxiety,  as  CA  scores  and  gender  had  no
igniﬁcant  interactions  with  stress  despite  exhibiting  signiﬁ-
ant  effects  on  conﬁdence  in  our  regression  model.  Although
ales  are  signiﬁcantly  more  overconﬁdent  than  females  in
ur  sample,  consistent  with  other  ﬁndings  in  the  literature
Gneezy  et  al.,  2003),  the  interaction  of  stress  with  trait
nxiety  remains  signiﬁcant  when  males  are  analyzed  sepa-
ately.  This  is  particularly  relevant,  as  gender  differences
n  risk-taking  behavior  have  been  reported  following  stress
xposure  (Lighthall  et  al.,  2009;  Van  den  Bos  et  al.,  2009).
According  to  emerging  literature  showing  that  trait  anx-
ety  moderates  the  impact  of  stress  on  brain  and  behavior
Sandi  and  Richter-Levin,  2009),  the  disparate  effects  found
or  stress  in  competitive  self-conﬁdence  when  high-  and  low-
nxiety  individuals  are  challenged  under  uncertainty  are
robably  embedded  in  individuals’  neurobiological  endow-
ent.  Indeed,  behavioral  and  cognitive  effects  of  stress  are
elieved  to  result  from  alterations  on  the  activity  of  large-
cale  brain  networks  (Drabant  et  al.,  2012;  Gathmann  et  al.,
014;  Hermans  et  al.,  2011).  Differences  in  trait  anxiety  can
esult  in  different  physiological  stress  responses  (Sandi  and
ichter-Levin,  2009);  however,  they  do  not  seem  to  account
or  the  observed  differences  in  competitive  decisions.  We
ound  that  changes  in  cortisol  levels  or  heart  rate  did  not
elate  to  trait  anxiety,  only  to  the  stress  manipulation.  How-
ver,  importantly,  we  found  clear  evidence  for  an  impact  of
ortisol  on  self-conﬁdence  that  strongly  depends  on  trait
nxiety:  whereas  higher  cortisol  responses  were  associated
ith  higher  conﬁdence  in  low-anxious  individuals,  the  oppo-
ite  association  was  observed  in  high  anxious  subjects.  These
emarkable  ﬁndings  suggest  that  glucocorticoids  impinge  a
ifferential  responsiveness  in  brain  function  and  behavior
n  individuals  that  differ  in  trait  anxiety,  and  ﬁt  with  the
dea  that  enhanced  glucocorticoid  levels  would  facilitate
ehavioral  responses  according  to  existing  predispositions.
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his  idea  is  in  line  with  rodent  studies  indicating  that  acute
ncreases  in  the  stress  hormone  corticosterone  exacerbate
ontext-dependent  status,  increasing  agonistic  responses  in
ominant  individuals  while  submissive  responses  in  subor-
ination  [see  Timmer  and  Sandi  (2010)  for  a  discussion;
ote,  though,  that  the  link  between  context  and  anxiety
n  those  examples  remains  to  be  established].  In  addition,
he  implication  of  cortisol  in  the  performance  in  the  eco-
omic  game  is  in  line  with  formerly  reported  rapid  effects
f  glucocorticoids  in  behavioral  coping  (Sandi  et  al.,  1996)
nd  social  interactions  (Mikics  et  al.,  2004).  Future  studies
re  warranted  to  examine  the  potential  differential  impact
f  cortisol  in  brain  activation  and  dynamics  in  high-  and
ow-anxiety  individuals.
Our  experimental  design  excludes  several  possible  inter-
retations,  such  as  a  role  for  changes  in  the  cost/beneﬁt
atio  involved  in  the  competition  (Johnson  and  Fowler,
011),  as  these  were  held  constant  across  the  two  options
i.e.  competition  or  lottery)  presented  to  the  partici-
ants.  Consequently,  potential  effects  of  stress  in  reward
esponsivity  (Ossewaarde  et  al.,  2011)  or  reward  learning
Cavanagh  et  al.,  2011)  cannot  account  for  our  ﬁndings.
n  addition,  our  experimental  design  excludes  the  possibil-
ty  that  overconﬁdent  participants  were  motivated  by  the
esire  to  send  positive  signals  to  others  about  their  own
kills  (Burks  et  al.,  2013),  as  their  decision-making  process
id  not  involve  any  direct  social  interaction.  Although  we  did
ot  ﬁnd  an  effect  of  gender  in  our  main  data,  a  limitation
f  our  study  is  that  we  did  not  collect  information  regarding
he  estrous  cycle  or  the  use  of  contraceptives,  which  pre-
luded  us  from  investigating  potential  effects  depending  on
hese  factors.  However,  it  is  important  to  emphasize  that  our
ain  results  remain  signiﬁcant  even  if  analyses  are  only  per-
ormed  in  our  male  sample.  Another  limitation  of  our  study
s  that  we  did  not  measure  anxiety  state  with  STAI-S  during
he  experimental  session  and,  therefore,  we  could  not  asses
he  relevance  of  this  factor,  on  its  own  or  in  interaction  with
rait  anxiety,  in  the  effect  of  stress  on  self-conﬁdence.
Most  of  the  previous  research  on  the  role  of  stress  in
conomic  outcomes  has  emphasized  the  negative  effects
f  stress  in  individuals’  physical  and  mental  health,  as  well
s  the  resulting  global  economic  burden  (Kalia,  2002).  Dif-
erences  in  health  are  predictive  of  major  socioeconomic
utcomes  and,  therefore,  can  operate  as  an  important
ource  for  social  inequalities  (Currie,  2011).  Our  study
eveals  a  new  and  broader  mechanism  whereby  stress  can
enerate  inequality  through  economic  decisions.
Therefore,  our  results  demonstrate  for  the  ﬁrst  time  an
nteraction  between  a  personality  trait  and  stress  exposure
n  competitive  self-conﬁdence,  implying  that  decision-
akers’  personality  and  the  environment  within  which  they
ct  can  interact  in  shaping  their  choices.  Our  ﬁndings  predict
hat  changes  in  the  stressful  nature  of  individuals’  environ-
ents  could  have  a  profound  impact  on  individuals  and  the
rganizations  within  which  they  interact,  depending  on  their
rait  anxiety.  Although  overconﬁdence  is  not  necessarily
eneﬁcial  in  all  possible  scenarios  (Barber  and  Odean,  2001;
amerer  and  Lovallo,  1999;  Deaves  et  al.,  2005;  Johnson
nd  Fowler,  2011;  Malmendier  and  Tate,  2005,  2008;  Plous,
993),  there  is  a  substantial  literature  showing  that  over-
onﬁdent  individuals  frequently  derive  both  psychological
Bénabou  and  Tirole,  2002;  Burks  et  al.,  2013;  Taylor  and
BL.  Goette  et  al.
rown,  1988)  and  social  advantages  (Anderson  et  al.,  2012)
rom  their  overconﬁdence.  Accordingly,  a  prediction  from
ur  study  is  that  stressful  environments  will  segregate  high-
nd  low-anxiety  individuals  by  their  ability  to  thrive  in  their
espective  social  environments,  with  individuals  character-
zed  by  low  anxiety  potentially  gaining  higher  social  status
han  those  characterized  by  high  anxiety.  As  a  result,  stress
ould  eventually  place  high-anxiety  individuals  in  a  disad-
antaged  position  for  gaining  access  to  contested  resources
nd  exerting  control  on  collective  matters.
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